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Abstract. The Fenian movement was born in 1858 as an alliance between the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood, a revolutionary secret society, and the Fenian Brotherhood, an Irish-American 
organisation intended to supply this society with funds and trained officers. This was not the first time 
that Irish nationalists on both sides of the Atlantic had tried to cooperate, but it was the first time that 
there was a steady arrangement in place. The Fenian partnership was extremely successful on the 
surface, but it was undermined by fundamental differences in customs, political attitudes and ultimate 
goals between Irish and American Fenians. The clearest evidence of these differences was afforded by 
the Fenian Brotherhood’s successive attempts to invade Canada between 1866 and 1871. As military 
episodes the Canadian raids were negligible; as Irish revolutionary attempts they seem absurd. 
However, they were a perfectly coherent manifestation of the Irish-American “hyphenated identity”. 
The present article traces the parallel evolution of the Irish Republican Brotherhood and the Fenian 
Brotherhood up to 1866, and reconstructs the cultural and political reasons for the revival of the 
Canadian scheme, the ensuing split in the Fenian Brotherhood, and the final collapse of the Fenian 
alliance. 
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Resumen. El movimiento Feniano surgió en 1858 como una alianza entre la Hermandad Republicana 
Irlandesa (Irish Republican Brotherhood), una sociedad secreta revolucionaria, y la Hermandad 
Feniana (Fenian Brotherhood), una organización americano-irlandesa concebida para suministrar a 
esta sociedad ayuda económica y militar. No era la primera vez que los nacionalistas irlandeses a 
ambos lados del Atlántico habían intentado colaborar, pero era la primera vez que establecían un 
acuerdo permanente. La alianza feniana resultaba enormemente provechosa en apariencia, pero en 
realidad se veía socavada por diferencias fundamentales en las costumbres, actitudes políticas y 
objetivos finales de fenianos irlandeses y americanos. La prueba más clara de estas diferencias fueron 
los sucesivos intentos de la Hermandad Feniana de invadir Canadá entre 1866 y 1871. Desde el punto 
de vista militar, las incursiones en Canadá fueron episodios insignificantes; como intentonas 
revolucionarias pueden parecer absurdas. Sin embargo, eran una manifestación perfectamente 
coherente de la “identidad con guión” (hyphenated identity) de los americano-irlandeses. El presente 
artículo traza la evolución paralela de la Hermandad Republicana Irlandesa y la Hermandad Feniana 
hasta 1866, y reconstruye las razones culturales y políticas del resurgimiento del proyecto de invasión 
de Canadá, la consiguiente escisión en la Hermandad Feniana, y el desmoronamiento final de la 
alianza entre fenianos irlandeses y americanos. 
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On 12 April 1866 The Brooklyn Daily Eagle 
released a third edition of the day’s issue with 
the following hurried report from Calais, on 
the border between the state of Maine and New 
Brunswick: 
There was much excitement yesterday and last 
night in St. Stephens, N. B., opposite this city. 
The fears of a Fenian raid somewhere on the 
border have been strengthening for several days 
past, but the precise point of attack is not yet 
known. …  
From two to three hundred men were under 
arms at St. Stephens all last night, and all the 
approaches to the town are strongly guarded, 
and every preparation made to receive the 
Fenians. 
The dreaded “Fenians” were the members of 
the Fenian Brotherhood, an Irish-American 
military society, and the ultimate object of the 
raid that was causing such a commotion was 
the “liberation” of Ireland from British rule. 
Since its foundation in 1858 the Fenian 
Brotherhood had been slowly evolving from a 
semi-secret military body at the service of the 
Irish Republican Brotherhood, a clandestine 
movement in Ireland, into a massive 
organisation with a weakness for public 
displays and an alarming potential for 
upsetting the delicate balance of post-Civil 
War Anglo-American relations. From 1866 to 
1871, at the height of Anglo-American 
tensions, Fenian parties carried out a series of 
startling although ineffectual raids into 
Canadian territory before the organisation 
exhausted its resources and definitely lapsed 
into decline. 
It has often been stated that the alarm caused 
by the first Fenian raids of 1866 gave the 
definite impulse to the Canadian Confederation 
of the following year (see for instance Watts 
1987: 771; Stacey 1968: 12). In all other 
respects, however, the raids have been 
generally dismissed as little more than comic-
opera episodes (Miller 1985: 336; Wilson 
2005: 50). But if they had little military value 
in themselves, they are a fundamental piece in 
the puzzle of Irish-American nationalism. As 
an approach to the cause of Irish independence, 
the raids illustrate all the complexities of the 
Irish-American nationalist commitment. As a 
revolutionary strategy, they evidence the 
chasm between the American Fenians and their 
Irish Republican Brotherhood allies “at home”, 
who were to be set aside when the Canadian 
scheme gained momentum. The reasons for the  
collapse of the Fenian movement in 1866 are 
various and complex, but the present article 
will trace the divergent evolution of Irish 
Republican Brotherhood and Fenian 
Brotherhood during these years in order to 
clarify the process leading to the Canadian 
crisis and the dissolution of the Fenian 
partnership. 
The Fenian venture was not the first attempt 
by Irish-Americans to promote Irish nationalist 
efforts, but it was the first time that they had a 
formal, long-term agreement with an Irish 
organisation for this purpose. Although both 
O’Connell’s Repeal Association and Young 
Ireland’s Irish Confederation in the 1840s had 
had their respective American branches, they 
were simply extensions of the parent 
organisation, and they did not play an 
instrumental role on events in Ireland. This 
situation began to change in 1848. The Irish 
Confederation, caught in the republican fever 
sparked by the “Spring of the Peoples” and 
desperate to stop the progress of the Famine, 
prepared to make their mark by launching an 
insurrection after the harvest. In the United 
States the newly-founded Irish Republican 
Union proposed to contribute to this 
insurrection by sending off an Irish brigade. 
The Nation newspaper reported a meeting of 
the Irish Republican Union in New York where 
it was,  
Resolved – That the real wants of Ireland at this 
moment are, a want of Republican spirit, and a 
want of military science. 
Resolved – That the object of the Irish 
Republican Union is, to supply her with those 
requisites, in the persons of a few thousand 
Americanized Irishmen, who are now ready and 
willing to embark in her battle. (The Nation, 22 
July 1848; Belchem 1995: 114)  
The term “Americanised Irishmen” might 
suggest that these nationalists considered 
themselves first and foremost Irish, with a 
smattering of American culture acquired by 
contact with their new host society. The 
situation, however, was exactly the reverse. 
Irish nationalist organisations in the United 
States followed American procedures, 
complied with American laws, and ultimately 
protected American interests. In fact, their 
commitment to their “native land” made these 
nationalists all the more strident in their 
proclamations of American patriotism by way 
of compensation. In this case, after a few  
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gentle hints by “friends of Ireland”, including the 
influential son of former President Tyler, 
warning that schemes of invasion were in 
violation of the American constitution, the Irish 
Republican Union rushed to proclaim their 
American patriotism and declared: 
The Irish Brigade had formed themselves for the 
purpose of acting as citizen soldiers, and taking 
their part in that capacity under the American 
flag (Cheers). There was nothing to prevent 
them going forward afterwards as private 
citizens, … to aid in her struggle, and in such a 
manner as would not give offence to America, 
or involve her in any way whatever (Belchem 
1995: 115). 
Their dual allegiance to Irish independence 
on the one hand, and American constitutional 
legality on the other, helped the Irish-
Americans to create for themselves a 
distinctive ethnic and political identity while 
striving for acceptance within the greater 
American society. But under these 
circumstances, as Thomas N. Brown explains, 
“in the minds of their members ... these 
organizations tended to assume a greater 
importance than the pursuit of Irish freedom. 
Ends and means got confused” (Brown 1966: 
38). The immediate necessities of the Irish-
American population tended to overshadow the 
distant utopia of an independent Ireland. This 
was stated explicitly in 1855 by the New York 
Herald’s correspondent in Richmond, when 
after reporting on a meeting of the Irish 
Emigrant Aid Society, one of the Irish 
Republican Union’s successor organisations, 
he concluded: 
My observation justifies me in saying that by far 
the most active influence at work in this 
movement, and that which gives it most vitality, 
is the proscriptive policy of the Know Nothings. 
… Believe me, they [the Irish] will make a bold 
effort to free their native country from English 
dominion; not so much with a view to better the 
condition of those now resident there, as to 
prepare for themselves a place of retreat from 
Know Nothing persecution. And if they fail, it is 
certain they will maintain the organization, and 
take a stand here in opposition to them (Tribune, 
15 December 1855). 
Filibustering schemes like the one planned by 
the Irish Republican Union in 1848 were not in 
themselves a very serious threat to British 
authority, especially when they were not 
coordinated with an organised uprising in 
Ireland itself, but there was a far greater danger 
across the American border in the shape of 
British Canada. Canada had several claims as 
the perfect target for Irish-American 
nationalists. As Irish, they looked on the 
Canadian provinces as fellow-victims of 
British monarchic rule in need of liberation and 
admission into the blessings of the Republic; as 
Americans, they advocated the annexation of 
Canada to the United States as part of the 
nation’s “manifest destiny” to extend its 
territory across the American continent. 
Although this is not to say that support for 
annexation was deep-rooted or widespread in 
the United States, the idea was well-established 
enough in American politics to surface with 
every crisis in Anglo-American relations, and 
Irish-American nationalists simply added their 
own particular motives to the general list. 
Canada had posed a security problem for the 
United States ever since the Revolutionary 
Wars, and annexation had emerged as a 
desirable development not only on economic 
but also defensive grounds. The scheme was 
thwarted during the eighteenth century owing 
to the lack of vital French support and the 
United States’ own weakness in the aftermath 
of independence (Horsman 1987: 7). At the 
time of the Anglo-American war of 1812, 
however, the American government included 
Canada in their military plans and launched 
several campaigns into Canadian territory. On 
this occasion, the editor of the Shamrock 
newspaper vowed that “Ireland would be 
rescued on the plains of Canada”, and 
encouraged both Irish-American citizens and 
Irish immigrants to enlist in order to prove 
their devotion to America (Senior 1978: 10). 
Now in 1848 one of the leaders of the Irish 
Republican Union declared: 
Canada contains hundreds of thousands of 
patriotic Irishmen and of Canadians, who sigh 
for annexation to this great and glorious 
republic. … It is therefore our manifest duty to 
Ireland, to Canada and to Freedom, to send such 
agencies as we deem most efficient to prepare 
the people of that oppressed colony for 
annexation to these United States, and thus 
complete the work that Washington began 
(Belchem 1995: 118). 
The Irish Republican Union’s warlike projects 
were frustrated by the failure of Young 
Ireland’s insurrection in July 1848, but Irish-
American nationalism was again revitalised by 
the trickle of exiles who arrived in the United 
States in the aftermath of the rising. One of the 
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first to arrive was Michael Doheny, a 
prominent veteran of both the Repeal 
Association and the Irish Confederation. 
Doheny placed much of the blame for their 
failure on their lack of preparation and military 
training, and he immediately set out to address 
the problem. The highly militarised American 
environment offered a ready-made solution in 
the shape of state militias, and Doheny threw 
himself into the work of organising volunteer 
Irish regiments. As he wrote to William Smith 
O’Brien ten years later, by 1853 the Irish 
regiments had swollen up to 25,000 members, 
but they went into rapid decline in the face of 
two main obstacles: the first one was the lack 
of support from Thomas Francis Meagher and 
John Mitchel, the two official leading lights of 
Irish-American nationalism; the second one, 
which Doheny partly blamed for the first, was 
the members’ own social shortcomings. As he 
lamented himself to Smith O’Brien, 
The officers were very generally so unlettered, 
untutored and even rude that association with 
them was disagreeable. You can have no 
conception of them from anything you 
experienced in the committee of the R[epeal] 
A[ssociation] because there after all education 
or rank commanded respect and deference 
whereas here the inevitable tendency of equality 
between an educated and uneducated and a 
superior and inferior man is to beget rudeness 
by way of an assertion of the equality (W. S. 
O’Brien Papers, NLI MS. 446/3058, 20 August 
1858). 
Doheny was a self-made man, the son of a 
farmer who had succeeded in becoming a 
barrister, and one of Young Ireland’s most 
politically advanced personalities, but even he 
could not escape the cultural shock that the 
Young Irelanders usually experienced on 
finding themselves in an actual republican 
society, where labourers were invited to attend 
presidential receptions and chambermaids on 
vacation socialised with ‘respectable’ people at 
holiday resorts (The Irishman, 29 September 
1849).  
In spite of these little roughnesses, however, 
American volunteer militias embodied many of 
the aspirations of “physical force” Irish 
nationalists. Holding arms was heavily 
restricted by British legislation in Ireland, and 
in times of unrest the government would 
immediately proclaim the troublesome districts 
and make it illegal altogether. In the United 
 
States, however, the right to bear arms was 
enshrined in the constitution itself, and the 
military spirit was extended to every aspect of 
American life. One British traveller even 
alluded to the “ludicrous, yet unmeant sarcasm 
on the abuse of military titles [which] exists in 
the appellation of ‘kitchen colonels’, given by 
servants in America to men servants in 
families.” (Thomas Colley Grattan in Allen 
1971: 273). Volunteer militias multiplied, and 
Irish-American nationalists took full  and 
enthusiastic advantage of them. From 1848 to 
1857 the Irish Republican Union was 
succeeded by organisations such as the Silent 
Friends, the Irishmen’s Civil and Military 
Republican Union, the Irish Emigrant Aid 
Society, and especially the Emmet Monument 
Association. All of these organisations were 
closely linked to the different state militias, 
and all of them intended to send military aid to 
Ireland in one shape or another.1 
Then, in the summer of 1857 the Sepoy 
rebellion in India again resuscitated the spirit 
of “England’s difficulty” – the eternal “Irish 
opportunity” – and the Emmet Monument 
Association set out to revive old projects. Its 
governing committee, led by Michael Doheny 
and John O’Mahony, sent an envoy to Ireland 
with a letter for James Stephens, a fellow 1848 
veteran, offering a volunteer force of 500 men 
and asking him to organise the country in 
preparation for their arrival. Stephens agreed 
on condition of receiving at least three 
instalments of £80 to £100, and especially of 
being appointed “a provisional dictator” 
(Denieffe 1969: 159-60). He did not specify 
whether he meant to dictate over the Irish 
organisation or the whole enterprise, but the 
Americans responded by appointing him 
“Chief Executive of the Irish Revolutionary 
movement” with “supreme control and 
absolute authority over that movement in 
Ireland” (Davitt Papers, TCD MS. 9659d/207, 
28 February 1858). On receiving this 
appointment and the first money instalment, on 
17 March 1858 Stephens and other Dublin 
nationalists founded the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood. The second instalment never 
arrived, however, and in October Stephens 
travelled to the United States in order to 
consolidate the new partnership and secure 
_________________ 
 1. For an excellent account of these and other Irish-
American organisations see Funchion 1983. 
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steady funding for the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood. At the end of the year the EMA 
became reorganised as the Fenian Brotherhood 
under John O’Mahony, but as part of the new 
arrangement Stephens also obtained a new 
commission as “Chief Executive of the Irish 
Revolutionary Movement” with “supreme 
control and absolute authority … at home and 
abroad”, that is, ultimate power over both the 
Irish and American branches of the new 
organisation (Davitt Papers, TCD MS. 
9659d/208, 9 December 1858).  
Stephens’s nominal position within the 
Fenian apparatus was more a symbol of the 
relationship between the new partners than any 
real measure of his authority, but the changes 
that it was to suffer over time did act as a 
barometer of the evolution of the Fenian 
Brotherhood itself. With a supreme 
commander based in Europe, it was understood 
– by Stephens, at any rate – that the Fenian 
Brotherhood existed to fulfil the revolutionary 
needs of the Irish “at home”. In this as in other 
issues he was catastrophically unaware of the 
deeper nature of Irish-American nationalism. 
And the mutual lack of understanding between 
Irish and American Fenians was evident even 
from Stephens’s first contacts with his new 
partners. 
In the course of his New York visit Stephens 
wrote a remarkable diary where he recorded 
the early days of the Fenian Brotherhood, but 
also his impressions as an Irishman of what he 
plainly called “the land of Self, Greed and 
Grab”. Ever the self-sufficient European, he 
judges American culture against Old World 
standards and invariably finds it wanting. The 
diary describes, and criticises, numerous 
aspects of life in America, from taste and 
customs to architecture and urban planning; his 
favourite word to describe the country is 
“ramshackleness”. And his American 
associates are but the natural product of this 
environment’s “debasing influences”: 
mediocre, poorly educated and lacking in any 
real political influence. And yet, as he 
deplores, 
The saddest – most disgusting – thing in this is, 
that these men are taught to fancy they have as 
good a right to sign documents, sit on 
committees, nay, lead nations, as the wisest – 
best of the children of men! We have far too 
much of this deplorable pretension in Ireland … 
but here it is incurable idiotcy, that is, the 
moment  an  Irishman  becomes  an  American  
politician; and I am sorry to learn that too many 
of them are such (Ramón 2008: 16-17). 
Yet American culture held many attractions for 
less fastidious revolutionaries than Stephens. 
The rank and file of the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood, working for “the Irish Republic, 
now virtually established” as their initiation 
oath would have it, adopted American 
republicanism as a model of behaviour and 
almost a state of mind. Being an Irish 
republican involved not only conspiring 
against the government in secret, but also 
disregarding social conventions in public. In 
the strongly hierarchical Irish society, refusing 
to abide by the laws of deference was a 
political statement in itself. One informer told 
the police in August 1864 that, 
In conversation a Fenian will use no kind of 
policy to any outside his society, or rarely any 
person or reverence a clergyman but they never 
salute either a nobleman or clergyman though 
knowing them well. ... In a word everything 
republican in Society is practised by the Fenians 
and in yankee fashion as far as can be by those 
who never were in Yankee Land (Fenian Police 
Reports, NAI, no. 44a, 19 August 1864).  
On the other hand, this sort of self-assertion 
was reserved to those in power outside the 
organisation. Irish Fenianism during 
Stephens’s time was described, although with 
some exaggeration, as “the most completely 
despotic system in the world” (Devoy 1969: 
95), and even though the members were often 
discontented with Stephens’s leadership they 
never made any serious effort to challenge his 
authority. This was to be the key to the 
differences between the Irish and American 
Fenians. While the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood was designed as a secret army 
under one commander-in-chief with 
theoretically unquestionable authority, the 
Fenian Brotherhood was a mixture of volunteer 
militia and American political organisation 
whose leader had to contend with differences 
of policy, internecine power struggles and 
democratic procedures that did not always 
work in his favour. 
Up to 1863 the Fenian Brotherhood had 
worked under a very similar structure to that 
governing the Irish Republican Brotherhood: a 
series of cells or “circles” each led by a 
“centre”, and all under the direction of a “Head 
Centre”, in this case John O’Mahony. 
However, this arrangement was not suitable for 
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political life in the United States, and the 
organisation had come under damaging 
accusations of being a secret society 
(Proceedings 1863: 58). Moreover, tension had 
been escalating between Stephens and 
O’Mahony over lack of progress and the 
relative position of the partners, and nominal 
subordination to Stephens had become 
impractical and obnoxious to O’Mahony. In 
November 1863 O’Mahony called a national 
convention in order to effect a series of 
changes. Before its commencement he wrote to 
Stephens: 
Brother, The time is come when I feel called 
upon to resign my position as H.C.F.B. into the 
hands of my constituents as they are to be 
represented at the forthcoming general 
Convention ... 
In order to be a perfectly free agent thereat I 
have herewith sent you my resignation as an 
officer of your command, a thing implied by my 
acceptance of an appointment from you, though 
as far as regards you personally I am an 
unpledged man (Pender 1976: 130-1).2 
At the end of the convention the Fenian 
Brotherhood became divided into state 
organisations, circles and sub-circles, each 
with its presiding officer. The whole structure 
was governed by a Head Centre and a Central 
Council of five members, besides a Central 
Treasurer and Assistant Central Treasurer, all 
to be elected annually. But the most important 
consequence of this convention for the Irish 
Fenians was the change that took place in the 
relative status of the Fenian Brotherhood and 
the “home organisation”. Thenceforth Stephens 
was acknowledged as “the Representative of 
the Fenian Brotherhood in Europe” (Ryan 
1967: 192). Not only had the Brotherhood 
become a conventional American political 
organisation, it had also reversed the balance of 
power and asserted itself as the sponsor and 
ultimate controller of the Irish movement. Both 
circumstances, the adoption of a political 
________________ 
2. The series by Seamus Pender ‘Fenian Papers in 
the Catholic University of America’, in the Cork 
Historical and Archaeological Society, was 
published in annual instalments between 1969 and 
1977. For the sake of convenience the present 
article will omit the individual bibliographical 
information for each article and provide an 
abbreviated reference by year and page number. 
 
structure and the declaration that this structure 
was sovereign and independent from the 
revolutionary movement in Ireland, was to 
have a crucial effect on future developments. 
For the moment, in 1864 Stephens travelled 
to the United States a second time in a bid to 
counteract the effects of the Fenian 
Brotherhood’s reorganisation and boost their 
fund-raising efforts in favour of the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood. In the course of his 
visit he pushed for the appointment of paid 
organisers and secured the adoption of 
measures giving him a more direct access to 
collected funds (Ramón 2007: 164-5). But 
more importantly, he also made a public 
announcement that the Fenian revolution 
would take place by the end of 1865. This new 
deadline was associated with the launch of a 
“final call” on the eve of the insurrection: a 
programme that included the issue of Fenian 
bonds to finance the last preparations, and the 
dispatch of discharged officers from the 
American Civil War to serve as military 
instructors to the Irish circles and take 
command of the Fenian army once the 
revolutionary war had started.  
The American officers who immediately 
started arriving on every steamer were widely 
set apart from their would-be Irish forces, not 
the least because in contrast with regular, 
“civilian” Irish Republican Brotherhood 
leaders, their commission carried a salary.3 But 
there were other features that made them 
conspicuous even to outsiders’ eyes, and more 
particularly the British authorities; if their 
American accent did not betray them on 
arrival, their clothes inevitably did. One 
informer supplied the following description to 
the police: 
The newly arrived envoy from Ireland is 
Captain O’Reilly. … O’Reilly is a man about 5 
feet 5 inches in height, well made, but not stout. 
... Beard dark consisting of slight moustache and 
side whiskers. Dress black hat, black American 
cloth, over-coat, long skirts, dark pantaloons, 
square-toed boots... (Fenian A Files, NAI, no. 
125). 
________________ 
3. By February 1866 the police had identified at 
least 500 of these strangers, 160 in Dublin alone 
(Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, third series, 
Vol. CLXXXI, Habeas Corpus Suspension (Ireland) 
Bill, 17 February 1866, 678). 
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The clothing issue had become obvious 
enough for a Fenian leader to suggest in one of 
his letters that “a man with square-toed shoes 
or boots will be ‘dogged’ everywhere if these 
precautions are not taken. … If going to remain 
here no new clothes should be bought beyond” 
(Pender 1971: 47).  
But clothing was not the only issue 
separating the visitors from the Irish members. 
The American officers were far more impatient 
for action and far less submissive to the 
dictates of the Irish Republican Brotherhood’s 
high command. Stephens, as always trying to 
keep a tight grip on the movement’s reins and 
prevent untimely personal initiatives, decided 
to keep them completely isolated from the 
circles. This arrangement was not calculated to 
favour cohesion and discipline in an eventual 
war of independence, but it was justified from 
Stephens’s point of view when one of them, a 
Colonel Buckley, attempted to bypass him and 
induce the rest of the officers to start the rising 
themselves (“An Account of Fenianism from 
April 1865 till April 1866 By one of the Head 
Centres for Ireland”, 100, in S. L. Anderson 
Papers, NLI MS. 5964; Takagami 1990: 118). 
The colonel was not successful, but this was a 
signal of more serious challenges to come from 
Stephens’s unruly American lieutenants. 
Meanwhile in October 1865 the Brotherhood 
held their third annual convention in 
Philadelphia, and at the end of it they adopted a 
new constitution that gave expression to the 
Fenian Brotherhood’s Americanness to the 
point of extravagance. The executive was 
reorganised as consisting of a President 
(O’Mahony) and a Senate of fifteen members, 
along with various other high-sounding 
executive posts including a Secretary of the 
Treasury and a Secretary of Naval Affairs (The 
Fenians’ Progress 1865: 75). After the 
Convention the Fenian Senate rented Moffat 
Mansion, near Union Square, to serve as the 
Fenian headquarters for $1,000 a month, and 
flaunted the Fenian flag of harp and sunburst 
from its windows. After all these changes the 
Fenian Brotherhood became a full-fledged 
Irish government in exile, a replica of the 
American Republic complete with its own 
capitol, president and house of representatives. 
Tensions, however, had been brewing for 
several years between O’Mahony and the 
different Fenian executives, and predictably 
now they were to explode under the pretext of 
a conflict over constitutional procedures.  
In September 1865 an informer handed the 
British authorities a document containing 
evidence of the “year of action” programme in 
Stephens’s own handwriting. This compelled 
the government to act against the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood once and for all, and 
on the night of 15 September 1865 they 
suppressed the Irish Republican Brotherhood 
newspaper the Irish People, put most of the 
leaders in prison, and started making wholesale 
arrests. From his hiding place Stephens wrote 
to the “American brothers”: 
Well, long as I am free I answer for everything. 
But once you hear of my arrest, only a single 
course remains to you. Send no more money 
from the States. Get all you can, though, and 
with it purchase all the war-material you can. 
Gather all the fighting men you [can] about you 
and then sail for Ireland. The heads here may be 
in the hands of the enemy and much confusion 
may prevail; but, with a Fenian force to rally 
them, be sure that overwhelming numbers shall 
be with you. But this must be done before next 
Christmas, after which date I would have no 
man risk his life or his money (Pender 1975: 
65). 
Stephens himself was arrested on 11 
November, but his capture was followed by a 
spectacular rescue from Richmond prison only 
two weeks later. Before the news reached 
America, O’Mahony rushed to issue the Bonds 
of the Irish Republic in order to come to the 
Irish Republican Brotherhood’s assistance as 
Stephens’s letter had urged. When the Bond 
Agent, Patrick Keenan, refused to endorse 
them and finally resigned, O’Mahony sent in 
his own name to be engraved on the bonds. 
This was in theoretical violation of the 
Philadelphia constitution, so on 2 December 
the Senate deposed O’Mahony and set William 
Randall Roberts in his place (D’Arcy 1971: 
103-4). Then O’Mahony denied the Senators 
access to Moffat Mansion, and they set up new 
headquarters at 706 Broadway. With this move 
the Fenian Brotherhood was officially split into 
two wings. 
The differences between these wings were 
curiously matched by the personalities of their 
respective leaders. Both had been born in 
Ireland. However, while O’Mahony remained a 
nostalgic exile, only longing for the day when 
he could return, Roberts was a professional 
American politician of the sort that had 
disgusted Stephens so much back in 1859. 
After his Fenian career was over he turned to  
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mainstream politics and went on to hold 
various public posts, from congressman to US 
Ambassador in Chile (D’Arcy 1971: 279 fn.). 
Thus, while O’Mahony’s efforts remained 
focused on the original plan of insurrection in 
Ireland, Roberts and his wing had a much more 
flexible approach to the cause, and picking up 
on a familiar tradition, concluded that the most 
practicable way to start the war of 
independence was to invade Canada. At least 
in theory, there were solid strategic reasons for 
this: Canada was closer than Ireland, and 
because of its size, much less heavily defended 
by the British army. Anglo-American tensions 
were at an all-time high after Britain had taken 
the Confederacy’s side during the Civil War, 
and again there were talks about annexing 
Canada to the United States in retaliation 
(Neidhardt 1975: 17).  
Just before the Philadelphia convention a 
Fenian delegation to President Johnson had 
been given to understand, though guardedly 
and never in writing, that if they managed to 
occupy Canadian soil the government would 
acknowledge accomplished facts. Even if they 
could not set up a permanent base of 
operations, the “Canada Fenians” at least 
hoped that a raid might trigger a war between 
Britain and the United States. But whatever the 
outcome, the beleaguered Irish Republican 
Brotherhood “at home” had ceased to have any 
part or say in Fenian calculations. Pressure for 
immediate action was so intense that even 
O’Mahony gave in to the appeals of his 
secretary of the treasury, Bernard Doran 
Killian, and authorised the first Fenian raid on 
the Canadian border. 
The first week of April 1866 several hundred 
O’Mahony Fenians flocked into Eastport, in 
the state of Maine, and waited for their ship, 
the E. H. Pray, to bring arms and ammunition 
for an attack on the small island of 
Campobello, in the Bay of Fundy, just on the 
border between Maine and New Brunswick. 
The Johnson administration did not intend to 
allow this attack to take place, but they could 
not afford to alienate the Irish-American 
electorate only a few months before the 
congressional elections by issuing an official 
condemnation, so they opted for a quiet 
intervention. Before the E. H. Pray could reach 
the Fenians it was intercepted by an American 
revenue cutter and its arms detained. On 19 
April General George Meade arrived on the 
scene, warned the Fenians against violating the  
neutrality laws under pain of arrest, confiscated 
their arms and simply sent them back on their 
way (Davis 1955: 322-32). 
All these events were putting increasing 
pressure on Stephens’s leadership. The 
government’s intervention had forced him to 
break his “year of action” pledge, and the 
Fenian Brotherhood split threatened to leave 
the Irish Republican Brotherhood stranded at 
the moment of its worst crisis. In March 1866 
he was smuggled out of Ireland, and two 
months later he disembarked in New York, 
accepted O’Mahony’s resignation, and started 
his own campaign to revert the Brotherhood’s 
attention towards action in Ireland. Despite his 
proverbial inflexibility where the cause was 
concerned, he was keenly aware of the 
allurements offered by the Canadian scheme. 
In a speech delivered on 24 August 1866 he 
told his audience: 
I make no complaint whatever; but there has 
been manifested through the press of this 
country, and by individual Americans, a certain 
amount of sympathy for parties who go and 
invade Canada (a voice – ‘We don’t want 
Canada’) Now, little real sympathy has been 
shown for those who would liberate Ireland on 
Irish soil. It will be said by all intelligent and 
impartial people that this is merely a question of 
interest. The annexation of Canada would 
benefit America, whereas she has nothing to 
gain by the independence of Ireland. But I say 
that this is a grave mistake, the mistake of 
narrow minds who sacrifice everything to party; 
for America would gain more than almost any 
man can calculate in the liberty of Ireland. In the 
first place the annexation of Canada would 
follow as a certain consequence from her 
liberation. ... A time of trouble may come once 
more in these States. All is not so consolidated 
here yet. You are not sure that a restored union 
will continue a fixed fact. Should war arise 
again in this country, and England’s army be 
free ... she would send out her fleets and armies 
to crush this country. But it is certain that if this 
country remains in power for a century, or even 
half that time, it will certainly crush England. 
And England knows this well (Fenian A Files, 
NAI, no. 180). 
Despite Stephens’s persuasive efforts, 
however, the Roberts wing remained by far 
the larger and more powerful side of the 
Fenian split. At the end of May 1866 it was 
their turn to carry out their own, more 
sophisticated attempt at invasion. In 
contrast with the straightforward  
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Campobello scheme, General Thomas Sweeny 
had planned a simultaneous attack on three 
fronts.4 The left column under Brigadier 
Charles Tevis was to proceed to the area 
around Chicago and Milwaukee; the centre 
column under Brigadier William F. Lynch was 
to gather around Lake Erie; and the right and 
largest column under Brigadier Samuel P. 
Spear was to assemble at St Albans, in 
Vermont. Tevis and Lynch were supposed to 
lead a diversionary attack on Toronto while 
Spear’s men crossed into Quebec and 
proclaimed the Irish Republic (Ellis 1986: 246-
7). This plan was scarcely more successful than 
the “Campobello fiasco” had been, but it did 
lead to the only Fenian victory against British 
troops. On 1 June Colonel John O’Neill 
crossed the Niagara river at Black Rock, near 
Buffalo, and the following day he defeated the 
volunteer corps of the Queen’s Own in the so-
called “battle of Ridgeway”, but he had no men 
or supplies to continue the campaign, and was 
forced to withdraw almost immediately 
afterwards. When O’Neill’s troops tried to 
cross the Niagara back into Buffalo to seek 
reinforcements they were intercepted by the 
US authorities, arrested, fined and finally 
released a few days later. 
The failure of the two Fenian raids of 1866 
hastened the decline of the Fenian 
Brotherhood. Although enthusiasm seemed to 
outlast the disaster for a while, the treasury on 
both sides had been exhausted, the leaders of 
both wings were caught up in internal quarrels, 
and membership began to fall away due to 
disappointment. Stephens spent the remainder 
of 1866 holding public meetings and making 
repeated vows to be in Ireland to lead the 
promised revolution before the end of the year. 
By the middle of December, however, he was 
preparing to postpone action for the third time 
in a year. Unfortunately for him, the officers of 
his American military council were not as 
understanding or as compliant as his Irish 
centres had been on the two previous 
occasions, and yielding to what Stephens 
bemoaned as “the false notion of equality” 
prevalent in the United States, at the end of 
December they deposed him from leadership 
(Pender 1976: 123; Ramón 2007: 222-4). The 
new Fenian executive then went on to launch 
_____________ 
4. Campobello scheme, General Thomas Sweeny 
had planned a simultaneous attack on three fronts. 
   the abortive rising of 5 March 1867.  
At the end of 1867 W. R. Roberts resigned 
the presidency of his wing in favour of John 
O’Neill, the “hero of Ridgeway”, and O’Neill 
continued to make plans of Canadian invasion, 
this time without even the slightest pretence of 
connection with the remnants of the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood in Ireland. After a last 
attempt along the Quebec-New York border in 
1870 which ended with the defeat at Eccles 
Hill, and a futile incursion into Manitoba in 
1871, the Canadian strategy was definitely 
abandoned.5  
As is the case with so many other episodes in 
Irish nationalist history, the Canadian raids are 
more significant as a symbol than as a material 
achievement, but as far as the symbol is 
concerned, few other episodes illustrate to the 
same degree the complex and ultimately 
precarious nature of the alliance between the 
Irish nationalists on both sides of the Atlantic. 
The Fenian Brotherhood was the Irish 
Republican Brotherhood’s greatest strength, 
but also its greatest weakness. Although the 
Irish-American nationalists liked to regard 
themselves as Irish, their efforts to 
accommodate the conflicting sides of their 
“hyphenated identity”, in John Belchem’s 
expression, engendered a variety of 
nationalism where the dream of Irish 
independence had to be made compatible with, 
and often subservient to, the demands of life in 
their adopted country (Belchem 1995: 111). 
Fenian proclamations of loyalty to the laws and 
institutions of the United States were not just a 
rhetorical convention; in the context of post-
war Anglo-American tensions the Fenians 
were justified in believing that by twisting the 
letter of American laws, they were also 
indirectly honouring the spirit of American 
interests. American Fenians had to divide their 
attentions between the land of their birth and 
the land of their adoption, and Canada seemed 
to offer the opportunity to serve both masters 
at the same time. It is not surprising that this 
should prove impossible; as it is not surprising 
that the Fenian Brotherhood’s successor, the 
Clan na Gael, should have a much longer and 
ultimately successful career as an effectually 
secretive organisation with none of the Fenian 
sensationalism, a more flexible, but also more 
_______________ 
5. For an account of the Fenian attempts on Canada 
after 1866 see Toner 1971. 
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stable relationship with the Irish Republican 
Brotherhood “at home”, and a new 
determination to cultivate the two sides of their  
 
“hyphenated identity” independently of each 
other. 
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